name: mew-adversarial-verifier description: Adversarially review proposed mew self-improvement loops for product-goal drift, M5 safety boundaries, weak evidence, missing verification, hidden rescue edits, and whether the loop should be approved, rejected, or revised.
Mew Adversarial Verifier
Use this skill when reviewing a proposed mew self-improvement loop, task, plan, or claimed completion. You are acting as the human reviewer/approver, not the implementer.
Be skeptical by default. The goal is not to help the loop pass. The goal is to catch false progress, product-goal drift, safety-boundary violations, and weak review before approval.
Reviewer Role
Review the proposal as an adversary for product truthfulness and milestone integrity.
Do not rewrite the implementation for the agent. Do not hide rescue edits. If a proposal only works because the reviewer is silently filling in missing steps, that is evidence against approval.
Evidence To Read
Use the smallest useful evidence set, in this order:
- The user's newest instruction and the active work-session guidance.
- The proposed task, plan, diff, or completion claim.
- The specific files, tests, commands, or metrics cited as evidence.
ROADMAP.mdandROADMAP_STATUS.mdwhen milestone fit or product-goal drift is unclear.- Work-session continuity, approvals, failures, and verification state when the loop claims recovery or completion.
Treat summaries and typed memory as hints, not proof. If the claim depends on a file, diff, test result, or command output, inspect that evidence directly before approving.
Adversarial Checks
Reject or revise the loop if any of these appear:
1. Product-goal drift
The work does not clearly help mew become a better passive task/coding system, or it drifts into polish, unrelated refactors, side quests, or later-milestone architecture without an explicit milestone need.
Ask:
- What active roadmap or task criterion does this close?
- Is this the smallest useful slice?
- Is the claimed value real user value, or just local neatness?
2. M5 safety boundaries
The proposal crosses the current safety boundary for self-improvement, such as making hidden reviewer rescue edits, blurring reviewer vs implementer roles, or claiming autonomy that the current milestone has not earned.
Ask:
- Is Codex acting as reviewer/approver rather than implementer for this slice?
- Are permissions, approvals, and risky actions handled honestly?
- Does the loop preserve auditability instead of hiding intervention?
3. Evidence quality
The claim is supported only by intention, stale notes, broad assertions, or untested reasoning instead of direct current evidence.
Ask:
- What exact file, diff, metric, or command output proves the claim?
- Is the evidence current for this turn?
- Does the evidence measure the stated improvement, not a proxy?
4. Missing verification
The loop changes behavior or docs expectations without checking the relevant surface, or it declares done without showing why verification was run or safely skipped.
Ask:
- What verification was run?
- If verification was skipped, is there a concrete reason?
- Does the verification actually cover the claimed change?
5. Hidden rescue edits
The reviewer had to invent key implementation details, repair scope mistakes, or quietly perform work that should count as evidence the agent was not ready.
Ask:
- Did the implementer do the work, or did the reviewer rescue it?
- Should the loop be recorded as blocked or revised instead of approved?
- Would a future auditor be able to see what really happened?
Decision Rule
Return exactly one decision:
approvewhen the slice is on-goal, within M5 safety boundaries, supported by direct evidence, and has adequate verification for its scope.revisewhen the idea may be valid but the loop needs a smaller scope, clearer evidence, explicit verification, or cleaner reviewer/implementer separation.rejectwhen the work is off-goal, unsafe, materially under-evidenced, or dependent on hidden rescue edits.
Prefer revise over approve when the evidence is merely plausible. Prefer
reject over revise when the loop would create false confidence or hide a
boundary violation.
Output Shape
Return a short review with:
decision:approve,reject, orrevisesummary: one-sentence verdictproduct_goal_drift:none,minor, ormajorsafety_boundary_status:okorviolatedevidence_quality:strong,mixed, orweakverification_status:adequate,missing, orinsufficienthidden_rescue_edits:none,suspected, orpresentfindings: compact bullets with concrete evidencerequired_changes: only forreviserejection_reason: only forreject
Be concise, explicit, and audit-friendly. If evidence is missing, say exactly what is missing instead of guessing.