name: agent-analytics description: Tracks key performance indicators (KPIs) for AI Agents: Token Usage, Task Duration, Loop Cycles, and Success Rate. triggers: [analytics, metrics, tokens used, cost tracking, performance report, agent stats] tags: [core] context_cost: low
Agent Analytics Skill
Goal
Provide visibility into the "Black Box" of agent execution by tracking cost (tokens) and efficiency (time/loops).
Flow
Steps
1. Metric Capture
Input: Completion of a Task / Tool Call / Phase. Action: Log the following structured data:
timestamp: ISO 8601agent_id: Loki / Claude / Geminitask_id: T-NNNtokens_in: (Estimated)tokens_out: (Estimated)duration_ms: Execution timestatus: SUCCESS | FAILURE | RETRY
2. Analysis & Alerts
- Loop Detection: If
task_idappears > 5 times inmetrics.logwithstatus: RETRY, triggerhuman_escalation. - Cost Anomaly: If
tokens_out> 5000 for a simple task, flag as "Verbose/Inefficient".
3. Reporting
Command: generate-report
Output: metrics/weekly_report.md
- Total Tokens consumed.
- Average Task Duration.
- Success Rate % (First-pass vs Retry).
Storage
agents/memory/metrics/analytics.jsonl(Append-only log)
Security & Guardrails
1. Skill Security (Agent Analytics)
- PII Scrubbing in Telemetry: Ensure that
task_idor any logged payload data does not inadvertently capture and store user PII or raw authentication tokens in theanalytics.jsonlfile. - Log Forgery Prevention: The analytics logging mechanism must be isolated so that a compromised agent cannot forge or alter historical telemetry data to hide malicious activity or disguise token theft.
2. System Integration Security
- Cost Denial of Service (DoS): Tie the anomaly detection (e.g.,
tokens_out > 5000) directly to a hard circuit breaker that revokes the agent's API keys or suspends the session to prevent runaway financial billing attacks. - Secure Metric Access: The
metrics/weekly_report.mdand raw log files must be access-controlled, as traffic patterns and task duration metrics can leak business intelligence or identify high-value target processes to an attacker.
3. LLM & Agent Guardrails
- Analytics Manipulation Defense: Agents must not have
writeaccess to historicalanalytics.jsonllines. They may only append new records. - Metric Hallucination Avoidance: If an LLM is used to summarize the weekly report, it must use hard math validation (e.g., via a Python script execution) rather than estimating or hallucinating aggregated token counts and success rates.