name: security-scanning-security-sast description: "SAST Security Plugin workflow skill. Use this skill when the user needs 'Static Application Security Testing (SAST) for code vulnerability and the operator should preserve the upstream workflow, copied support files, and provenance before merging or handing off." version: "0.0.1" category: testing-security tags: ["security-scanning-security-sast", "static", "application", "security", "testing", "sast", "for", "vulnerability"] complexity: advanced risk: caution tools: ["codex-cli", "claude-code", "cursor", "gemini-cli", "opencode"] source: community author: "sickn33" date_added: "2026-04-15" date_updated: "2026-04-25"
SAST Security Plugin
Overview
This public intake copy packages plugins/antigravity-awesome-skills-claude/skills/security-scanning-security-sast from https://github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills into the native Omni Skills editorial shape without hiding its origin.
Use it when the operator needs the upstream workflow, support files, and repository context to stay intact while the public validator and private enhancer continue their normal downstream flow.
This intake keeps the copied upstream files intact and uses the external_source block in metadata.json plus ORIGIN.md as the provenance anchor for review.
SAST Security Plugin Static Application Security Testing (SAST) for comprehensive code vulnerability detection across multiple languages, frameworks, and security patterns.
Imported source sections that did not map cleanly to the public headings are still preserved below or in the support files. Notable imported sections: Capabilities, Safety, SAST Tool Selection, Vulnerability Patterns, Framework Security, Multi-Language Scanner Implementation.
When to Use This Skill
Use this section as the trigger filter. It should make the activation boundary explicit before the operator loads files, runs commands, or opens a pull request.
- You only need runtime testing or penetration testing
- You cannot access the source code or build outputs
- The environment forbids third-party scanning tools
- Use when the request clearly matches the imported source intent: 'Static Application Security Testing (SAST) for code vulnerability.
- Use when the operator should preserve upstream workflow detail instead of rewriting the process from scratch.
- Use when provenance needs to stay visible in the answer, PR, or review packet.
Operating Table
| Situation | Start here | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| First-time use | metadata.json | Confirms repository, branch, commit, and imported path through the external_source block before touching the copied workflow |
| Provenance review | ORIGIN.md | Gives reviewers a plain-language audit trail for the imported source |
| Workflow execution | SKILL.md | Starts with the smallest copied file that materially changes execution |
| Supporting context | SKILL.md | Adds the next most relevant copied source file without loading the entire package |
| Handoff decision | ## Related Skills | Helps the operator switch to a stronger native skill when the task drifts |
Workflow
This workflow is intentionally editorial and operational at the same time. It keeps the imported source useful to the operator while still satisfying the public intake standards that feed the downstream enhancer flow.
- Identify the languages, frameworks, and scope to scan.
- Select SAST tools and configure rules for the codebase.
- Run scans in CI or locally with reproducible settings.
- Triage findings, prioritize by severity, and propose fixes.
- Confirm the user goal, the scope of the imported workflow, and whether this skill is still the right router for the task.
- Read the overview and provenance files before loading any copied upstream support files.
- Load only the references, examples, prompts, or scripts that materially change the outcome for the current request.
Imported Workflow Notes
Imported: Instructions
- Identify the languages, frameworks, and scope to scan.
- Select SAST tools and configure rules for the codebase.
- Run scans in CI or locally with reproducible settings.
- Triage findings, prioritize by severity, and propose fixes.
Imported: Capabilities
- Multi-language SAST: Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Ruby, PHP, Go, Rust
- Tool integration: Bandit, Semgrep, ESLint Security, SonarQube, CodeQL, PMD, SpotBugs, Brakeman, gosec, cargo-clippy
- Vulnerability patterns: SQL injection, XSS, hardcoded secrets, path traversal, IDOR, CSRF, insecure deserialization
- Framework analysis: Django, Flask, React, Express, Spring Boot, Rails, Laravel
- Custom rule authoring: Semgrep pattern development for organization-specific security policies
Examples
Example 1: Ask for the upstream workflow directly
Use @security-scanning-security-sast to handle <task>. Start from the copied upstream workflow, load only the files that change the outcome, and keep provenance visible in the answer.
Explanation: This is the safest starting point when the operator needs the imported workflow, but not the entire repository.
Example 2: Ask for a provenance-grounded review
Review @security-scanning-security-sast against metadata.json and ORIGIN.md, then explain which copied upstream files you would load first and why.
Explanation: Use this before review or troubleshooting when you need a precise, auditable explanation of origin and file selection.
Example 3: Narrow the copied support files before execution
Use @security-scanning-security-sast for <task>. Load only the copied references, examples, or scripts that change the outcome, and name the files explicitly before proceeding.
Explanation: This keeps the skill aligned with progressive disclosure instead of loading the whole copied package by default.
Example 4: Build a reviewer packet
Review @security-scanning-security-sast using the copied upstream files plus provenance, then summarize any gaps before merge.
Explanation: This is useful when the PR is waiting for human review and you want a repeatable audit packet.
Best Practices
Treat the generated public skill as a reviewable packaging layer around the upstream repository. The goal is to keep provenance explicit and load only the copied source material that materially improves execution.
- Run early and often - Pre-commit hooks and CI/CD
- Combine multiple tools - Different tools catch different vulnerabilities
- Tune false positives - Configure exclusions and thresholds
- Prioritize findings - Focus on CRITICAL/HIGH first
- Framework-aware scanning - Use specific rulesets
- Custom rules - Organization-specific patterns
- Developer training - Secure coding practices
Imported Operating Notes
Imported: Best Practices
- Run early and often - Pre-commit hooks and CI/CD
- Combine multiple tools - Different tools catch different vulnerabilities
- Tune false positives - Configure exclusions and thresholds
- Prioritize findings - Focus on CRITICAL/HIGH first
- Framework-aware scanning - Use specific rulesets
- Custom rules - Organization-specific patterns
- Developer training - Secure coding practices
- Incremental remediation - Fix gradually
- Baseline management - Track known issues
- Regular updates - Keep tools current
Troubleshooting
Problem: The operator skipped the imported context and answered too generically
Symptoms: The result ignores the upstream workflow in plugins/antigravity-awesome-skills-claude/skills/security-scanning-security-sast, fails to mention provenance, or does not use any copied source files at all.
Solution: Re-open metadata.json, ORIGIN.md, and the most relevant copied upstream files. Check the external_source block first, then restate the provenance before continuing.
Problem: The imported workflow feels incomplete during review
Symptoms: Reviewers can see the generated SKILL.md, but they cannot quickly tell which references, examples, or scripts matter for the current task.
Solution: Point at the exact copied references, examples, scripts, or assets that justify the path you took. If the gap is still real, record it in the PR instead of hiding it.
Problem: The task drifted into a different specialization
Symptoms: The imported skill starts in the right place, but the work turns into debugging, architecture, design, security, or release orchestration that a native skill handles better. Solution: Use the related skills section to hand off deliberately. Keep the imported provenance visible so the next skill inherits the right context instead of starting blind.
Related Skills
@00-andruia-consultant- Use when the work is better handled by that native specialization after this imported skill establishes context.@00-andruia-consultant-v2- Use when the work is better handled by that native specialization after this imported skill establishes context.@10-andruia-skill-smith- Use when the work is better handled by that native specialization after this imported skill establishes context.@10-andruia-skill-smith-v2- Use when the work is better handled by that native specialization after this imported skill establishes context.
Additional Resources
Use this support matrix and the linked files below as the operator packet for this imported skill. They should reflect real copied source material, not generic scaffolding.
| Resource family | What it gives the reviewer | Example path |
|---|---|---|
references | copied reference notes, guides, or background material from upstream | references/n/a |
examples | worked examples or reusable prompts copied from upstream | examples/n/a |
scripts | upstream helper scripts that change execution or validation | scripts/n/a |
agents | routing or delegation notes that are genuinely part of the imported package | agents/n/a |
assets | supporting assets or schemas copied from the source package | assets/n/a |
Imported Reference Notes
Imported: Safety
- Avoid uploading proprietary code to external services without approval.
- Require review before enabling auto-fix or blocking releases.
Imported: SAST Tool Selection
Python: Bandit
# Installation & scan
pip install bandit
bandit -r . -f json -o bandit-report.json
bandit -r . -ll -ii -f json # High/Critical only
Configuration: .bandit
exclude_dirs: ['/tests/', '/venv/', '/.tox/', '/build/']
tests: [B201, B301, B302, B303, B304, B305, B307, B308, B312, B323, B324, B501, B502, B506, B602, B608]
skips: [B101]
JavaScript/TypeScript: ESLint Security
npm install --save-dev eslint @eslint/plugin-security eslint-plugin-no-secrets
eslint . --ext .js,.jsx,.ts,.tsx --format json > eslint-security.json
Configuration: .eslintrc-security.json
{
"plugins": ["@eslint/plugin-security", "eslint-plugin-no-secrets"],
"extends": ["plugin:security/recommended"],
"rules": {
"security/detect-object-injection": "error",
"security/detect-non-literal-fs-filename": "error",
"security/detect-eval-with-expression": "error",
"security/detect-pseudo-random-prng": "error",
"no-secrets/no-secrets": "error"
}
}
Multi-Language: Semgrep
pip install semgrep
semgrep --config=auto --json --output=semgrep-report.json
semgrep --config=p/security-audit --json
semgrep --config=p/owasp-top-ten --json
semgrep ci --config=auto # CI mode
Custom Rules: .semgrep.yml
rules:
- id: sql-injection-format-string
pattern: cursor.execute("... %s ..." % $VAR)
message: SQL injection via string formatting
severity: ERROR
languages: [python]
metadata:
cwe: "CWE-89"
owasp: "A03:2021-Injection"
- id: dangerous-innerHTML
pattern: $ELEM.innerHTML = $VAR
message: XSS via innerHTML assignment
severity: ERROR
languages: [javascript, typescript]
metadata:
cwe: "CWE-79"
- id: hardcoded-aws-credentials
patterns:
- pattern: $KEY = "AKIA..."
- metavariable-regex:
metavariable: $KEY
regex: "(aws_access_key_id|AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID)"
message: Hardcoded AWS credentials detected
severity: ERROR
languages: [python, javascript, java]
- id: path-traversal-open
patterns:
- pattern: open($PATH, ...)
- pattern-not: open(os.path.join(SAFE_DIR, ...), ...)
- metavariable-pattern:
metavariable: $PATH
patterns:
- pattern: $REQ.get(...)
message: Path traversal via user input
severity: ERROR
languages: [python]
- id: command-injection
patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern: os.system($CMD)
- pattern: subprocess.call($CMD, shell=True)
- metavariable-pattern:
metavariable: $CMD
patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern: $X + $Y
- pattern: f"...{$VAR}..."
message: Command injection via shell=True
severity: ERROR
languages: [python]
Other Language Tools
Java: mvn spotbugs:check
Ruby: brakeman -o report.json -f json
Go: gosec -fmt=json -out=gosec.json ./...
Rust: cargo clippy -- -W clippy::unwrap_used
Imported: Vulnerability Patterns
SQL Injection
VULNERABLE: String formatting/concatenation with user input in SQL queries
SECURE:
# Parameterized queries
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = %s", (user_id,))
User.objects.filter(id=user_id) # ORM
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
VULNERABLE: Direct HTML manipulation with unsanitized user input (innerHTML, outerHTML, document.write)
SECURE:
// Use textContent for plain text
element.textContent = userInput;
// React auto-escapes
<div>{userInput}</div>
// Sanitize when HTML required
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
element.innerHTML = DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput);
Hardcoded Secrets
VULNERABLE: Hardcoded API keys, passwords, tokens in source code
SECURE:
import os
API_KEY = os.environ.get('API_KEY')
PASSWORD = os.getenv('DB_PASSWORD')
Path Traversal
VULNERABLE: Opening files using unsanitized user input
SECURE:
import os
ALLOWED_DIR = '/var/www/uploads'
file_name = request.args.get('file')
file_path = os.path.join(ALLOWED_DIR, file_name)
file_path = os.path.realpath(file_path)
if not file_path.startswith(os.path.realpath(ALLOWED_DIR)):
raise ValueError("Invalid file path")
with open(file_path, 'r') as f:
content = f.read()
Insecure Deserialization
VULNERABLE: pickle.loads(), yaml.load() with untrusted data
SECURE:
import json
data = json.loads(user_input) # SECURE
import yaml
config = yaml.safe_load(user_input) # SECURE
Command Injection
VULNERABLE: os.system() or subprocess with shell=True and user input
SECURE:
subprocess.run(['ping', '-c', '4', user_input]) # Array args
import shlex
safe_input = shlex.quote(user_input) # Input validation
Insecure Random
VULNERABLE: random module for security-critical operations
SECURE:
import secrets
token = secrets.token_hex(16)
session_id = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
Imported: Framework Security
Django
VULNERABLE: @csrf_exempt, DEBUG=True, weak SECRET_KEY, missing security middleware
SECURE:
# settings.py
DEBUG = False
SECRET_KEY = os.environ.get('DJANGO_SECRET_KEY')
MIDDLEWARE = [
'django.middleware.security.SecurityMiddleware',
'django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware',
'django.middleware.clickjacking.XFrameOptionsMiddleware',
]
SECURE_SSL_REDIRECT = True
SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE = True
CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE = True
X_FRAME_OPTIONS = 'DENY'
Flask
VULNERABLE: debug=True, weak secret_key, CORS wildcard
SECURE:
import os
from flask_talisman import Talisman
app.secret_key = os.environ.get('FLASK_SECRET_KEY')
Talisman(app, force_https=True)
CORS(app, origins=['https://example.com'])
Express.js
VULNERABLE: Missing helmet, CORS wildcard, no rate limiting
SECURE:
const helmet = require('helmet');
const rateLimit = require('express-rate-limit');
app.use(helmet());
app.use(cors({ origin: 'https://example.com' }));
app.use(rateLimit({ windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, max: 100 }));
Imported: Multi-Language Scanner Implementation
import json
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Dict, List, Any
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime
@dataclass
class SASTFinding:
tool: str
severity: str
category: str
title: str
description: str
file_path: str
line_number: int
cwe: str
owasp: str
confidence: str
class MultiLanguageSASTScanner:
def __init__(self, project_path: str):
self.project_path = Path(project_path)
self.findings: List[SASTFinding] = []
def detect_languages(self) -> List[str]:
"""Auto-detect languages"""
languages = []
indicators = {
'python': ['*.py', 'requirements.txt'],
'javascript': ['*.js', 'package.json'],
'typescript': ['*.ts', 'tsconfig.json'],
'java': ['*.java', 'pom.xml'],
'ruby': ['*.rb', 'Gemfile'],
'go': ['*.go', 'go.mod'],
'rust': ['*.rs', 'Cargo.toml'],
}
for lang, patterns in indicators.items():
for pattern in patterns:
if list(self.project_path.glob(f'**/{pattern}')):
languages.append(lang)
break
return languages
def run_comprehensive_sast(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Execute all applicable SAST tools"""
languages = self.detect_languages()
scan_results = {
'timestamp': datetime.now().isoformat(),
'languages': languages,
'tools_executed': [],
'findings': []
}
self.run_semgrep_scan()
scan_results['tools_executed'].append('semgrep')
if 'python' in languages:
self.run_bandit_scan()
scan_results['tools_executed'].append('bandit')
if 'javascript' in languages or 'typescript' in languages:
self.run_eslint_security_scan()
scan_results['tools_executed'].append('eslint-security')
scan_results['findings'] = [vars(f) for f in self.findings]
scan_results['summary'] = self.generate_summary()
return scan_results
def run_semgrep_scan(self):
"""Run Semgrep"""
for ruleset in ['auto', 'p/security-audit', 'p/owasp-top-ten']:
try:
result = subprocess.run([
'semgrep', '--config', ruleset, '--json', '--quiet',
str(self.project_path)
], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=300)
if result.stdout:
data = json.loads(result.stdout)
for f in data.get('results', []):
self.findings.append(SASTFinding(
tool='semgrep',
severity=f.get('extra', {}).get('severity', 'MEDIUM').upper(),
category='sast',
title=f.get('check_id', ''),
description=f.get('extra', {}).get('message', ''),
file_path=f.get('path', ''),
line_number=f.get('start', {}).get('line', 0),
cwe=f.get('extra', {}).get('metadata', {}).get('cwe', ''),
owasp=f.get('extra', {}).get('metadata', {}).get('owasp', ''),
confidence=f.get('extra', {}).get('metadata', {}).get('confidence', 'MEDIUM')
))
except Exception as e:
print(f"Semgrep {ruleset} failed: {e}")
def generate_summary(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Generate statistics"""
severity_counts = {'CRITICAL': 0, 'HIGH': 0, 'MEDIUM': 0, 'LOW': 0}
for f in self.findings:
severity_counts[f.severity] = severity_counts.get(f.severity, 0) + 1
return {
'total_findings': len(self.findings),
'severity_breakdown': severity_counts,
'risk_score': self.calculate_risk_score(severity_counts)
}
def calculate_risk_score(self, severity_counts: Dict[str, int]) -> int:
"""Risk score 0-100"""
weights = {'CRITICAL': 10, 'HIGH': 7, 'MEDIUM': 4, 'LOW': 1}
total = sum(weights[s] * c for s, c in severity_counts.items())
return min(100, int((total / 50) * 100))
Imported: CI/CD Integration
GitHub Actions
name: SAST Scan
on:
pull_request:
branches: [main]
jobs:
sast:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: actions/setup-python@v4
with:
python-version: '3.11'
- name: Install tools
run: |
pip install bandit semgrep
npm install -g eslint @eslint/plugin-security
- name: Run scans
run: |
bandit -r . -f json -o bandit.json || true
semgrep --config=auto --json --output=semgrep.json || true
- name: Upload reports
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: sast-reports
path: |
bandit.json
semgrep.json
GitLab CI
sast:
stage: test
image: python:3.11
script:
- pip install bandit semgrep
- bandit -r . -f json -o bandit.json || true
- semgrep --config=auto --json --output=semgrep.json || true
artifacts:
reports:
sast: bandit.json
Imported: Limitations
- Use this skill only when the task clearly matches the scope described above.
- Do not treat the output as a substitute for environment-specific validation, testing, or expert review.
- Stop and ask for clarification if required inputs, permissions, safety boundaries, or success criteria are missing.