name: lucidchart-security-basics description: 'Security Basics for Lucidchart.
Trigger: "lucidchart security basics".
' allowed-tools: Read, Write, Edit version: 1.0.0 license: MIT author: Jeremy Longshore jeremy@intentsolutions.io tags:
- saas
- lucidchart
- diagramming compatibility: Designed for Claude Code
Lucidchart Security Basics
Overview
Lucidchart documents often contain sensitive business diagrams — org charts, network topologies, database schemas, and architecture plans that reveal internal infrastructure. The API uses OAuth2 client credentials, meaning a compromised client secret grants access to every document the integration can reach. Collaboration sharing with granular permission levels (view, edit, owner) must be enforced server-side. API versioning via the Lucid-Api-Version header requires pinning to avoid unexpected schema changes that break validation logic.
Prerequisites
- OAuth2 client ID and secret stored in a secrets manager (not environment files)
- HTTPS enforced on all redirect URIs and webhook endpoints
Lucid-Api-Versionheader pinned to a tested version in all requests.envfiles in.gitignore— never committed to version control
API Key Management
// OAuth2 client credentials — load from secrets manager at startup
const LUCID_CLIENT_ID = process.env.LUCID_CLIENT_ID;
const LUCID_CLIENT_SECRET = process.env.LUCID_CLIENT_SECRET;
function validateLucidConfig(): void {
if (!LUCID_CLIENT_ID || !LUCID_CLIENT_SECRET) {
throw new Error('Missing LUCID_CLIENT_ID or LUCID_CLIENT_SECRET');
}
}
async function getLucidAccessToken(): Promise<string> {
const resp = await fetch('https://api.lucid.co/oauth2/token', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
body: new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: 'client_credentials',
client_id: LUCID_CLIENT_ID!,
client_secret: LUCID_CLIENT_SECRET!,
}),
});
if (!resp.ok) throw new Error(`OAuth2 token request failed: ${resp.status}`);
const { access_token } = await resp.json();
return access_token;
// Cache token until expiry — never log it
}
Webhook Signature Verification
import crypto from 'node:crypto';
const LUCID_WEBHOOK_SECRET = process.env.LUCID_WEBHOOK_SECRET!;
function verifyLucidWebhook(payload: string, signature: string): boolean {
const expected = crypto
.createHmac('sha256', LUCID_WEBHOOK_SECRET)
.update(payload, 'utf8')
.digest('hex');
return crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(signature), Buffer.from(expected));
}
app.post('/webhooks/lucidchart', (req, res) => {
const sig = req.headers['x-lucid-signature'] as string;
if (!sig || !verifyLucidWebhook(JSON.stringify(req.body), sig)) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid webhook signature' });
}
// Process verified document change event
});
Input Validation
// Validate document IDs and enforce API version pinning
const LUCID_API_VERSION = '1';
function validateDocumentId(docId: string): boolean {
// Lucid document IDs are alphanumeric UUIDs
return /^[a-f0-9-]{36}$/.test(docId);
}
function lucidApiHeaders(token: string): Record<string, string> {
return {
Authorization: `Bearer ${token}`,
'Lucid-Api-Version': LUCID_API_VERSION,
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
};
}
Data Protection
function redactDiagramMetadata(doc: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> {
const sensitive = ['creator_email', 'collaborator_emails', 'share_link', 'embed_url'];
const redacted = { ...doc };
for (const field of sensitive) {
if (redacted[field]) redacted[field] = '[REDACTED]';
}
return redacted;
}
// Always redact before logging — diagrams may contain org charts and network layouts
Access Control
type LucidPermission = 'view' | 'edit' | 'owner';
function assertDocumentPermission(
userRole: LucidPermission,
requiredRole: LucidPermission
): void {
const hierarchy: LucidPermission[] = ['view', 'edit', 'owner'];
if (hierarchy.indexOf(userRole) < hierarchy.indexOf(requiredRole)) {
throw new Error(`Insufficient permission: need "${requiredRole}", have "${userRole}"`);
}
}
// Enforce server-side — never rely on Lucidchart UI permissions alone
Security Checklist
- OAuth2 client secret in secrets manager, rotated on schedule
- Access tokens cached in memory only, never persisted to disk or logs
-
Lucid-Api-Versionheader pinned to a tested version - Webhook signatures verified with HMAC-SHA256
- Document sharing permissions enforced server-side
- Collaborator emails redacted before logging
- Exported diagrams (PNG/PDF) treated as confidential artifacts
- OAuth2 scopes requested at minimum privilege
Error Handling
| Vulnerability | Risk | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Client secret in logs | Full API access compromise | Never log OAuth2 credentials; redact in error handlers |
| Unverified webhooks | Spoofed document change events | Reject requests without valid x-lucid-signature |
| Unpinned API version | Breaking schema changes bypass validation | Always send Lucid-Api-Version header |
| Over-permissioned sharing | Unauthorized diagram access | Enforce view/edit/owner hierarchy server-side |
| Diagram data in logs | Leaked org charts and network topology | Redact creator, collaborator, and share URLs |
Resources
Next Steps
See lucidchart-prod-checklist.