name: detection-rule-bypass-analyzer description: Helps detection engineers identify coverage blind spots in system command execution detection rules, evaluate bypass risks, and reduce false negatives. Strictly limited to system command execution rules; not applicable to browser credential theft or abnormal process creation without command semantics. author: SOCLabs version: 2.0

Detection Rule Bypass Analyzer

1. Overview

Trigger this Skill when a user asks "Is it possible to bypass this rule?" or "Is the detection logic comprehensive?". This Skill is exclusively designed to analyze system command execution detection rules. By deconstructing the rule logic and combining it with real OS command parsing characteristics (e.g., POSIX standards, Windows command-line parsing mechanisms), it accurately pinpoints blind spots in parameter coverage, order, aliases, and abbreviations, and outputs specific bypass test cases.

Core Principle: Do not stay at the surface level of syntax. You must complete the full analytical chain: "Understand attack intent -> Deconstruct matching logic -> Verify real command semantics -> Determine bypass feasibility -> Output bypass cases".

2. Scope and Boundaries

Applicable only when the rule targets system command execution and the user's goal is to find detection blind spots/bypass methods.

3. Core Workflow

Step 1: Identify Rule Background and Attack Intent

• Penetrate literals: Don't just look at what strings the rule matches. Point out the ultimate security objective behind the command (e.g., privilege escalation, persistence, backdoor account creation, defense evasion, credential access).
• Auto-completion: If the user doesn't provide the background, infer it based on command semantics. For example, the intent of usermod -u 0 -o is "Create/modify a privileged backdoor account".

Step 2: Deconstruct Rule Matching Logic

Extract and clarify the current rule's detection boundaries:

1. Core Command: The native system command involved (e.g., usermod, powershell, xattr).
2. Matching Fields: CommandLine, ProcessName, Image, etc.
3. Matching Operators: Exact match (==), contains, regex, wildcard (*), etc.
4. Hardcoded Conditions: Hardcoded strings, parameters, order, or paths in the rule.
5. Filter Conditions: Whitelist exclusions.

Step 3: Verify Based on Real System Semantics (Guessing is Strictly Prohibited)

Must verify using real OS command help documentation (--help, man) or official parsing characteristics:

• Parameter Control: Which parameters truly determine the success of the malicious behavior?
• Parameter Flexibility: Is reordering allowed? Are they optional? Are there mutually exclusive parameters?
• Equivalent Expressions: Long/short options (-u vs --uid), synonymous commands.
• Parsing Characteristics: Linux option bundling (-ds), Windows prefix abbreviations (-Enc vs -EncodedCommand).

Step 4: Determine Bypass Possibility

Based on the above analysis, provide a clear qualitative conclusion:

• 🔴 Clear Bypass Exists: Found commands that achieve the same malicious intent and will definitely not be hit by the current rule.
• 🟡 Potential Bypass Exists: Rule coverage is narrow, but whether it can be bypassed depends on the underlying log collector (e.g., whether the EDR normalizes the command line before collection).
• 🟢 No Obvious Bypass Found: The current rule logic is rigorous, and no valuable equivalent bypass commands were found.

Step 5: Deduce and Output Bypass Variants

Exhaustively list valuable bypass commands from the following four dimensions (ignore simple process name bypasses using sh -c; focus on the parsing characteristics of the command parameters themselves):

1. Parameter Morphology Changes:
   • Long/short option substitution (-u ↔ --uid)
   • Assignment method changes (space-separated ↔ = assignment ↔ seamless concatenation, e.g., -u 0 ↔ --uid=0 ↔ -u0)
2. Syntax and Parsing Characteristics:
   • Parameter reordering, interleaved operands (cmd arg1 -a arg2)
   • Option bundling (POSIX feature, e.g., xattr -d -s ↔ xattr -ds)
   • Parameter prefix abbreviations (Windows feature, e.g., PowerShell's -ec, -enc, /e)
3. Equivalent Substitution and Omission:
   • Omit unnecessary parameters that are hardcoded in the rule
   • Use other parameter combinations that achieve the same effect (e.g., clear attributes ↔ delete attributes)
4. Obfuscation and Escaping (if the rule doesn't use regex or normalization):
   • Extra spaces, quote wrapping ("u"sermod or usermod -u '0')
   • Substitution between absolute and relative paths

4. Output Format Standard

Strictly follow this Markdown structure to output the analysis results:

🎯 1. Rule Background & Detection Objective

Detection Objective: [A one-sentence description of the attacker's ultimate malicious purpose using this command, e.g., Using usermod to change a user's UID to 0 to create a Root privilege backdoor]

🔍 2. Rule Matching Logic Deconstruction

Current Logic: [A one-sentence summary of the rule's matching conditions, e.g., Requires the command line to contain "usermod", "-u", "0", and "-o" simultaneously and in order] Flaws: [Point out logical flaws, e.g., Hardcoded parameter order, missing long options]

⚠️ 3. Bypass Feasibility Conclusion

Conclusion: [🔴 Clear Bypass Exists / 🟡 Potential Bypass Exists / 🟢 No Obvious Bypass Found]

🛡️ 4. Bypass Test Cases

Note: The following commands can all execute successfully in a real system and achieve the same malicious objective.

5. Reference Knowledge Base (Parsing Characteristics Memo)

• Linux/macOS (POSIX) Parsing Characteristics:
  • Supports option bundling: -a -b is equivalent to -ab.
  • Option and value concatenation: -u 0 is equivalent to -u0.
  • Equals sign assignment: --uid 0 is equivalent to --uid=0.
  • Interleaved positional parameters: cmd -a file -b is usually equivalent to cmd file -a -b.
• Windows (PowerShell/CMD) Parsing Characteristics:
  • Symbol substitution: / can replace - (e.g., /c ↔ -c).
  • Prefix abbreviation matching: PowerShell parameters support the shortest unambiguous prefix. For example, -EncodedCommand can be abbreviated as -Encod, -Enc, -e, or even -ec.
  • Character obfuscation: CMD supports the ^ escape character; PowerShell supports the backtick ` escape character.